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Introduction
This policy brief addresses questions about Arctic gov-
ernance through a study of the Arctic interests of four 
Asian states (China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea) 
and how three Arctic states (USA, Russia and Norway) 
are meeting this increased interest. While both the 
more novel and longstanding Arctic interests of Asian 
states have been sufficiently mapped out elsewhere, 
the reactions of Arctic states to this rising interest 
have remained understudied.1  
The research findings presented here come from a 
project funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Defense. 
27 persons from policy, scientific and commercial 
circles in the studied Asian and Arctic states were in-
terviewed. Official documents, scientific articles and 
media coverage have also been analyzed. A more de-
tailed presentation of this research is available in an 
academic article published online in Polar Geography 
in July 2013.2 
The Current State of the Arctic
In their Arctic strategy documents, the five Arctic 
coastal states all point to increased shipping traffic 
1 The Asian states’ interests have been well-mapped elsewhere. 
Please see: Jakobson, L. and Lee S. 2013. The North East Asian 
States’ Interests in the Arctic and Possible Cooperation with the 
Kingdom of Denmark. SIPRI. April 2013. http://www.sipri.org/
research/security/arctic/arcticpublications/NEAsia-Arctic%20
130415%20full.pdf 
 Watters, S. and Tonami, A. 2012. Singapore: An Emerging Arc-
tic Actor. In L. Heininen (Ed.), Arctic Yearbook 2012 (pp. 105-
114). Akureyri, Iceland: Northern Research Forum. http://www.
arcticyearbook.com/images/Articles_2012/Tonami_and_Wat-
ters_Singapore.pdf
2 Solli, P.E., Wilson Rowe, E. and Yennie Lindgren, W. 2013. 
Coming into the cold: Asia’s Artic Interests. Polar Geography. 
30 July 2013. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10
88937X.2013.825345
 
and petroleum/mining activities as promising eco-
nomic possibilities, and possible security and govern-
ance challenges. From a broader governance perspec-
tive, the coastal states assert the sufficiency of existing 
legal regimes as the basis for Arctic governance. The 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is 
now recognized by all state and non-state actors inter-
ested in Arctic developments as the basis for the Arc-
tic’s legal regime and the division of responsibilities 
between coastal states. 
From a security perspective, the Arctic is an area of 
low tension. Claims and disputes are negotiated be-
tween the Arctic coastal states and are not likely to es-
calate into security issues. For example, Norway and 
Russia had overlapping claims in the Barents Sea, 
however an agreement was negotiated and signed in 
2010. The defense establishments of the Arctic states 
promote peacetime confidence building measures. 
There are regular military exercises in the region in-
volving two or more Arctic states, also between NATO 
and non-NATO member states. All of the peacetime 
military cooperative bi-/multilateral arrangements in 
the Arctic are between states. The NATO organization 
does not intend to increase its activity in the Arctic in 
peacetime and encourages cooperation between all 
the Arctic states. However, NATO’s wartime collec-
tive defense framework is applicable for all member 
states, also in the High North.
The two annual multilateral military meetings that 
have been established to involve all Arctic states – 
the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable in 2011 and the 
high-level Northern Chiefs of Defense Meeting in 
2012 – mainly discuss the soft security and military 
support to civilian agencies responsible for safety re-
lated matters that have become increasingly important 
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with growing levels of human activity in the Arctic 
Ocean.3 This emphasis on safety capabilities corre-
sponds with recent efforts under the auspices of the 
Arctic Council that resulted in a new search and res-
cue agreement (2011) and an oil spill preparedness and 
response agreement (2013).4
The changing physical environment of the Arctic, 
the continued development of Arctic governance and 
regulations, and the prospect of new economic oppor-
tunities have contributed to a sharpened interest of 
non-Arctic states in regional political processes. Asian 
states have demonstrated an increasing attentiveness 
to the region, most recently through their successful 
applications to gain permanent observer status in the 
preeminent regional forum – the Arctic Council. The 
rising interest of non-Arctic actors, especially the most 
recent round of permanent observer applications to 
the Arctic Council, sparked wide-ranging discussion 
about regional governance and security, particularly 
in the national media and policy communities of Arc-
tic states. What are the interests of Asian states in the 
Arctic and how do they relate to the current state of 
Arctic governance? Are there any implications for se-
curity in the Arctic region?
Arctic Interests of Asian States
China, South Korea and Japan have longstanding 
polar research traditions, including, for example, re-
search stations on Svalbard, and all four Asian states 
analyzed have well-developed stakes and participation 
in development of maritime law and maritime cooper-
ation more broadly. The maritime and polar scientific 
activities of all four Asian states are integrated into es-
tablished international scientific and policy communi-
ties.
It is a prevailing view in Asian business and policy cir-
cles that increased commercial activity in the Arctic is 
likely in the long term, but there are diverging views 
and assessments about profitability in the short term. 
In general, commercial companies in Asia do not have 
ambitious plans in the short term and have a ‘wait-
and-see’ attitude for the long-term developments. At 
3 The focus areas in these meetings are: how to build a common 
regional situational picture, communication system challeng-
es, common exercises, best practices in cold weather opera-
tions, establishing an overview of regional national military as-
sets that can be employed in safety-related incidents and how to 
support civilian agencies in peacetime incidents. The military 
working level meetings enable a direct dialogue and informa-
tion sharing between the military institutions. The two meet-
ings that have appeared lately may be a temporary measure or 
evolve into a different format in the future. 
4 There are no connections or relations between the military 
meetings and the Arctic Council or any other regional organi-
zation.
the same time, they want to be well-positioned for 
possible future opportunities. For example, the Asian 
states in our study all have longstanding shipping in-
terests. Nonetheless, while our interviewees were in-
terested in the Northern Sea Route as a shorter path 
between Asia and Europe, they were keenly aware of 
the higher investment and operating costs for opera-
tions in the Arctic. The question of commercial viabil-
ity is also a factor influencing the rate of growth of oth-
er economic activities in the Arctic of potential appeal 
to Asian states, such as offshore petroleum drilling in 
the Arctic. China has shown the most concrete inter-
est in Arctic commercial mining opportunities, which 
corresponds with its broader global pursuit of mineral 
and energy resources for its industries. 
The sovereign rights of the Arctic coastal states under 
international law and the regional structures for coop-
eration and coordination seem now to be well-accepted 
and understood by China, Japan, South-Korea and Sin-
gapore. This can likely be attributed to these countries’ 
own geopolitical interests and histories of involve-
ment in the development of international maritime 
law, as well as clear signals given by the Arctic states 
themselves about the prerequisites for participation in 
Arctic forums. Under the Arctic Council’s ‘Nuuk Cri-
teria’ of 2011, non-Arctic states and other organizations 
(such as NGOs) have to formally recognize the Arctic 
states’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in 
the Arctic in order to be granted permanent observer 
status. They also have to recognize that an extensive 
legal framework applies to the Arctic, including UN-
CLOS. Here it is important to note that UNCLOS also 
grants important user rights in the Arctic Ocean to 
non-Arctic states, such as freedom of navigation and 
the right to innocent passage, among others. In their 
applications for permanent observer status in the Arc-
tic Council, China, Japan, South Korea and Singapore 
formally concurred with the Nuuk Criteria.
In terms of security concerns, the Asian states ana-
lyzed in our study primarily relate security in the Arc-
tic context to non-traditional security concerns that are 
likely to have a domestic impact. They associate cli-
mate change with food security and agricultural pro-
duction, and see scientific activities in the Arctic and 
Antarctica as valid barometers to assess global climate 
trends. Their domestic energy security concerns relate 
to market access to petroleum resources in the Arc-
tic and safe transportation of those resources. Some 
of the studied Asian states expressed concern about 
threats to their domestic infrastructure from ice melt-
ing in the polar areas and the resulting sea-level rise. 
In the Arctic itself, the Asian states studied are con-
cerned with the development of safety arrangements 
to serve as frameworks for their ongoing scientific ac-
tivities and anticipated commercial activities.
3While the Asian states have done little to coordinate 
their Arctic initiatives amongst themselves, their ap-
proach to Arctic politics has included largely the same 
emphases. They are particularly interested in econom-
ic opportunities and environmental issues, primarily 
climate change and other issues that lend themselves 
to cooperative scientific research. In keeping with the 
Nuuk Criteria, these countries have outlined areas of 
Arctic governance where they have a demonstrable in-
terest and capacity to contribute and political/geopolit-
ical rhetoric was consistently absent or toned down in 
how these countries expressed their interests in Arctic 
affairs.
Reception of Asian States’ Interests by Arctic States
The studied Asian states do not have a radical revi-
sionist agenda when it comes to Arctic governance. 
Furthermore, permanent observers have a relatively 
marginal place in the formal workings of the Arctic 
Council. However, accepting Asian observer appli-
cations was hotly contested prior to and during the 
Council’s ministerial meeting in Kiruna in May 2013. 
The divergences amongst Arctic states on the issue of 
observers is especially striking, given that there has 
been increasingly strong convergence in how Arctic 
states represent and discuss the region in national pol-
icy documents. While Denmark/Greenland, Norway, 
Finland and Sweden were openly welcoming of non-
Arctic states’ applications to the Arctic Council after 
the Nuuk ministerial in 2011, Russia and Canada were 
more clearly skeptical and the U.S. position was not 
actively communicated until the Kiruna ministerial in 
2013. 
The reactions of Arctic states to Asian states’ Arctic in-
terests have been marked by a number of specificities 
that could be contributed to specific national interests 
or foreign policy traditions. Canada’s concerns about 
the 2013 group of observer applications was primarily 
directed towards the EU’s application for observer sta-
tus (particularly in light of the EU’s ban on the import 
of seal products), as well as worries about the potential 
inefficiency of and the dilution of Permanent Partici-
pants’ status and capacity in a broadened Arctic Coun-
cil. All countries’ reactions may have also been colored 
by broader foreign policy trends relating to how to 
meet China’s continued global economic, political 
and military rise. Russia’s overall foreign policy pref-
erence for smaller multilateral formats and exclusive 
clubs and a cautious approach to China’s geopolitical 
rise were likely contributing factors to a less actively 
welcoming stance. 
At the Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Kiruna 
in 2013, the U.S. actively supported the applications 
from all the Asian states to become permanent ob-
servers. Well in advance of the Kiruna ministerial, 
Norway, like the other Nordic countries, also publicly 
promoted an inclusive policy towards China and other 
applicant states from Asia on the condition that they 
demonstrated an ability to be active contributors to the 
Council’s work. The U.S. and other member states in 
the Council were also concerned about the risk of be-
ing perceived as advocates of western protectionism if 
the applications were declined. The Asian states put a 
lot of political prestige into their applications, and the 
candidacies were an issue of attention in national and 
international media.
This varied reception of Asian states’ applications in 
the days and years leading up to the unanimous de-
cision to approve these applications in May 2013 also 
speaks to some broader divergences about how Arctic 
governance should take shape. Our interviews with 
Arctic states suggests that there are important junc-
tures ahead relating to how the Arctic Council should 
develop and how Arctic states place the emphasis be-
tween the Arctic’s regional and global significance. 
Not all countries are for the often-discussed idea of 
the Arctic Council growing from its current ‘decision 
shaping’ status to a ‘decision making’ body. That the 
U.S. remains committed to the Arctic Council as a ‘fo-
rum’ and against a substantially expanded remit may 
have made it easier to give a pragmatic ‘yes’ to further 
observers. If the Council remains a ‘forum’ for coordi-
nation, the composition of the observer membership 
has less importance for U.S. Arctic interests. Canada 
and Russia, on the other hand, were concerned that a 
greater number of Arctic Council participants, even in 
the capacity of observers, could make arriving at con-
sensus more difficult and time-consuming, particu-
larly if the desired goal of a strengthened mandate for 
the Council were to be achieved. 
Other interviewees suggested that the Arctic coun-
tries’ reactions to the observer applications had much 
to do with how different Arctic states envisioned the 
Arctic’s place in the world. How tied into global proc-
ess and politics do the key Arctic states prefer to envi-
sion the region? To what extent does a more ‘global’ 
vision of the Arctic serve to weaken or strengthen the 
influence of the Arctic states themselves? These ques-
tions of how to represent and understand the politi-
cal significance of the Arctic have direct consequences 
for the extent to which non-Arctic states belong in the 
preeminent Arctic body and also point to trends in 
Arctic governance that merit further study.
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Summary
In their applications to become permanent observ-
ers to the Arctic Council, China, Japan, South Korea 
and Singapore all formally recognized the Arctic re-
gion’s political and legal framework, the sovereign 
rights of the Arctic coastal states and other elements 
of governance in the Arctic Council. The Asian states 
mainly have scientific and commercial interests in the 
Arctic, and emphasize access, availability and safety. 
Domestic concerns influence the funding of scien-
tific research about the impact of a changing Arctic 
environment, as climate change and new weather pat-
terns can affect food production and threaten coastal 
infrastructure. Future commercial petroleum, ship-
ping and mining opportunities in the Arctic are of in-
terest in some Asian commercial and policy circles. 
The studied Asian states do not, however, plan on a 
substantial increase in their commercial activities in 
the Arctic in the near future, but are open for future 
expansion of their involvement if it is commercially 
viable. While China, Japan, South Korea and Singa-
pore do not seek an active role in traditional security 
matters in the region, they do emphasize safety for 
their current and anticipated scientific and commer-
cial operations in the Arctic. This dovetails well with 
an increased emphasis on safety issues in the Arctic 
Council over the past four years. 
There were divergences among USA, Russia, Nor-
way and other Arctic states on the issue of new per-
manent observers from Asia to the council. China’s 
application was perhaps the most debated due to the 
country’s emerging status as a major global economic 
power. The reactions of the eight Arctic states to Asian 
states’ Arctic interests have been marked by a number 
of specificities that can be attributed to specific na-
tional interests, for example differing approaches to 
China’s global role or aims in other international set-
tings, and to varied foreign policy traditions, such as 
preferences for small multilateral forums or concerns 
about efficiency. These varied reactions also speak to 
broader junctures ahead in terms of how the Arctic 
Council develops and how its strategic significance is 
envisioned by member states. Though the member 
states in the Arctic Council had different views regard-
ing the Permanent Observer applications from Asian 
states, they ultimately unanimously accepted all non-
Arctic state observer applications at the Kiruna Minis-
terial Meeting in 2013.5 
5 India and Italy was also accepted as Permanent Observers in 
addition to China, Japan, South Korea and Singapore.  Several 
organizations also applied, but none of them were accepted at 
the Kiruna meeting. The EU application for observer status 
was deferred until Canada’s reservations are resolved, and if 
so the Arctic Council can grant the EU the status of Permanent 
Observer without a new consideration in the next ministerial 
meeting.  
